might call the norms and values of public international law into the "private" sector.
There are many ways in which private military companies, government officials, and non-governmental organizations seeking to prevent military contractors from committing abuses can use governmental contracts to incorporate crucial public law values, including human rights, transparency, and anticorruption norms. 7 Contracts could be drafted explicitly to extend relevant norms of public international law to private contractors, provide for enhanced oversight and enforcement, and include more specific terms such as carefully drafted training and accreditation requirements. Further, this analysis has drawn on insights from the scholarly literature on the long-standing trend within the United States to privatize domestic governmental functions, such as prison management, healthcare, welfare, and education. 8 In each of these contexts, scholars have noted efforts to incorporate various substantive and procedural accountability mechanisms into privatization contracts; similar provisions could be included in contracts with private military companies.
This chapter explores the numerous objections that policymakers and scholars might make to such contractual provisions. To be sure, because few commentators have focused specifically on the role that contract might play in the arena of military privatization, no one has yet articulated a comprehensive set of objections. Nonetheless, it is possible to extrapolate from the debates about privatization in the domestic context. Drawing on those debates, six objections to the idea of reforming contracts so as to make them a more effective tool for regulatory oversight can be identified. Critics might argue that: (1) the existing contractual framework is sufficient without any reforms; (2) reforming contracts would be a costly venture that would eat up any cost savings from privatization; (3) neither government officials nor private military companies are likely to agree to such reforms; (4) the structure of the private military contractor market itself undermines the prospects of successful contractual regulation; (5) reforms that grant rights to third parties either to participate in contract design or to file grievances would be unwieldy; or (6) terms in governmental contracts are difficult to enforce, and expanding enforcement to include third parties would be impossible to manage. Each of these will be considered in turn, along with a response supporting both the viability and desirability of contractual provisions as a means of regulating PMC conduct. 6 One scholar who has is Steve Schooner, a government contracts expert who has identified problems in the Iraq military and reconstruction contracts. See Steven L. Schooner, "Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government", Stanford Law and Policy Review, vol. 16 (2005) , pp. 549ff. Schooner has not, however, focused specifically on how contracts could be used to protect human rights. 7 See Dickinson, "Public Law Values in a Privatized World" (footnote 1 above). 8 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, "The Private Role in Public Governance", New York University Law Review, vol. 75 (2000) , pp. 543 ff; Gillian Metzger, "Privatization as Delegation", Columbia Law Review, vol. 103 (2003) , pp. 1367 ff.
The adequacy of the existing contractual framework
A number of critics who oppose regulation of private military companies have implied that reform of the governmental contracting process is unnecessary. Instead, it is contended that existing contractual arrangements and industry self-regulation are the most effective means of curbing abuses. Deborah Avant would similarly eschew most forms of regulation other than efforts to professionalize the culture of private military company employees. 9 The current contractual framework is far from adequate, however, as examples from the US-led military and reconstruction efforts in Iraq demonstrate. Contractor interrogators working for the firm CACI tortured detainees at Abu Ghraib and subjected them to cruel treatment, and contractor translators working for the firm Titan were also implicated. Victims have since brought suit against the contractors in US courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and have alleged violations of international law. 10 In addition to violating human rights, Iraq contractors have also been implicated in fraud and other financial abuses. For example, Kellogg, Brown & Root's more than $10 billion in contracts with the US government in Iraq "have been dogged by charges of preferential treatment, over-billing, cost overruns, and waste." 11 Perhaps even more egregious was Custer Battles, a company that had received two $16 million contracts from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide security for the Baghdad airport and distribute Iraqi dinars. Custer Battles employees reportedly chartered a flight to Beirut with $10 million in new Iraqi dinars in their luggage, set up sham Cayman Islands subsidiaries to submit invoices, and regularly overcharged for materials -in one case allegedly billing the United States $10 million for materials that it purchased for $3.5 million.
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A jury issued a $10 million verdict against Custer Battles in connection with such abuses.
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In a similar case, former US occupation official Robert J. Stein has pleaded guilty 9 See chapter ten in this volume by Deborah Avant. 10 See case cited in footnote 2 above. to charges of corruption and bribery in the award of reconstruction contracts.
14 Army reserve officers have also been arrested and indicted for charges in related proceedings, and a US businessman, Philip Bloom, has pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy and money laundering. 15 At the core of the inquiry, prosecutors say, was a scheme in which Stein and other officials steered at least $8.6 million in reconstruction contracts to companies controlled by Bloom, in exchange for millions of dollars in bribes, jewellery and other favours. 16 Stein also pleaded guilty to federal weapons charges for having used the money to buy submachine guns, grenade launchers and other weapons in the United States. Investigators suspect that there may be a link between these cases and the death of human rights worker Fern Holland and press officer Robert Zangas. 17 Moreover, all indications are that the corruption that has come to light so far is only the tip of the iceberg. In short, corruption and fraud have been rampant in the Iraqi contracts.
The existing governmental contracts have clearly not prevented such abuses. A careful examination of such agreements both highlights their deficiencies and at the same time suggests possible reforms. In a recent study, for example, I examined all publicly available Iraq military and reconstruction contracts entered into by the US government, and compared them to agreements between local state government contracts involving roughly analogous domestic governmental functions, such as prison management.
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In contrast to the domestic agreements, the Iraq contracts are strikingly vague. And though some flexibility is undoubtedly necessary to cope with the exigencies and security concerns inherent in the sorts of environments where PMCs are likely to be used, the foreign contracts (at least those that are publicly available) possess so few guidelines, requirements, or benchmarks that they effectively contain no meaningful evaluative criteria whatsoever. Drawing on the lessons from the domestic setting, these contracts could be reformed in a number of ways that would have a significant impact. Specifically, the contracts could resolve any lingering ambiguity about the applicability of international human rights and humanitarian law, include more specific terms, such as training and accreditation requirements, and provide for enhanced monitoring, oversight, and enforcement.
in this context. Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. 
Making human rights and humanitarian law apply
Perhaps most importantly, the contracts could explicitly require that the contractors obey the norms that implement public law values. The terms of each agreement could provide that private contractors must abide by relevant human rights and humanitarian law rules applicable to governmental actors. Such contractual terms would obviate the need to show that the private actors were functioning as an extension of government so as to satisfy any state action requirement that might arise under domestic and international legal regimes. Instead, the norms applicable to governmental actors would simply be part of the contractual terms, enforceable like any other provisions, regardless of state action. The agreements between the US government and CACI to supply military interrogators starkly illustrate this point. The intelligence personnel were hired pursuant to a standing "blanket purchase agreement" between the Department of the Interior and CACI, negotiated in 2000. 22 Under such an agreement the procuring agency need not request specific services at the time the agreement is made but rather may enter task orders as the need arises. In 2003 eleven task orders, worth $66.2 million, were submitted (none of which was the result of competitive bidding).
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The orders specify only that CACI would provide interrogation support and analysis work for the US Army in Iraq, including "debriefing of personnel, intelligence report writing, and screening/interrogation of detainees at established holding areas." 24 Significantly, the orders do not expressly require that the private contractor interrogators comply with international human rights or The agreement says nothing about whether the interpreters must be effective or how effectiveness might be measured. Similarly, the CACI task orders for interrogators specify only that CACI will provide interrogation support and analysis work for the US Army in Iraq, including "debriefing of personnel, intelligence report writing, and screening/interrogation of detainees at established holding areas."
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Other than these broad goals, the task orders say little more. Security imperatives may sometimes require some degree of vagueness. Nonetheless, the task orders could be much more specific about training requirements, standards of conduct, supervision, and performance parameters.
Furthermore, contracts could require that independent organizations accredit military contractors. Industry organizations have in fact begun to do so. In chapter thirteen of this volume Andrew Bearpark and Sabrina Schulz describe such an initiative in Britain. 33 The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), another industry-based organization, has launched a similar effort.
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Independent organizations without industry ties could establish a rating system as well. Yet amazingly, not one of the available contracts for aid or military services in Iraq requires that the entities receiving the contracts be vetted or accredited by independent organizations.
On this score, the domestic context provides a particularly rich set of models as to how an accreditation scheme might work. For example, in the healthcare field, state laws or contractual terms often specify that health maintenance organizations (HMOs) must receive accreditation by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), an independent non-profit organization, before receiving public funding. When states became managed care purchasers, however, they adopted NCQA as a benchmark of quality.
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Many contracts with private prison operators require companies to receive accreditation by the American Correctional Association. 37 And because private investors come to view accreditation as an indicator of quality, an accreditation requirement creates significant compliance incent ives.
Enhancing oversight
The Iraq contracts also fall far short in the arena of monitoring and enforcement. 38 It should go without saying that any effective contractual regime must include sufficient numbers of trained and experienced governmental contract monitors, along with a team of governmental ombudspersons: leaders of independent offices charged with providing enhanced oversight. Recently the government has moved in precisely the wrong direction, however, by dramatically reducing its acquisitions workforce.
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And few contract monitors are trained in international human rights and humanitarian law standards.
An added problem is the prevalence of broad, standing purchase agreements, which agencies can use as a basis for issuing work orders. The use of such work orders enables government actors to avoid more stringent regulations that apply to negotiating contracts. In addition, because one agency can earn fees by facilitating another agency's contracts, there are incentives to sponsor other agencies' contracts but little incentive to supervise them. 40 These arrangements can lead to abuse, as occurred in the case of the Department of 35 Although NCQA's accreditation program is voluntary, almost half the HMOs in the nation, covering three quarters of all HMO enrolees, are currently involved in the NCQA Accreditation process. Significantly, employers increasingly require or request NCQA accreditation of the plans with which they do business. See National Comm. for Quality Assurance, NCQA: Overview, available at http://www.ncqa.org/Communications/Publications/overviewncqa.pdf. 36 Freeman, "The Private Role in Public Governance" (footnote 8 above), pp. 618-619. 37 See, e.g., Oklahoma Contract (footnote 25 above).
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For a searing indictment of the government's failure to oversee military contractors and that failure's role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, see Schooner, "Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib" (footnote 6 above). In addition, contracts should include terms allowing the government to take over contracts by degrees for failure to observe international human rights and humanitarian law norms. In the domestic context, states are turning to mechanisms such as graduated penalties, for example, to increase oversight of private nursing homes receiving public funding. 41 Although many of the US Iraq contracts do have termination provisions, outright termination is an extreme measure that the government rarely exercises. Indeed, after CACI employees were implicated in the abuse at Abu Ghraib, not only did government actors fail to terminate the contract, they actually expanded its terms. Graduated takeover provisions would help alleviate the problem by permitting a more moderate remedy short of outright termination.
Perhaps even more importantly, contracts should provide for enhanced whistleblower protections and third-party suit provisions. Currently, only the government or the contractor may enforce the terms of the agreement. Yet those who are subject to a contractor security action should be deemed third-party beneficiaries, either by statute or through contractual terms. Accordingly, third parties would be able to make private law claims under the contracts for non-compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law norms. Claims could be heard and adjudicated in courts or, alternatively, through grievance procedures established and run either by the contractor itself or by a professional association of contractors. Such privatized grievance mechanisms are commonplace in contracts with private prison operators 42 or HMOs receiving federal funding to cover their treatment of Medicare beneficiaries. 43 And though, as discussed below, critics might worry that granting such rights might be unwieldy, third-party beneficiary provisions could be crafted to take account of the exigencies of various types of contracts.
These various reforms provide a menu of possible contractual provisions that, while by no means a panacea, would almost certainly improve the meagre contractual oversight that now exists. Thus, to argue that reforms are unnecessary or that they would necessarily be ineffectual lacks empirical support. And in any event, given the widespread abuses in the current contracting process, settling for the status quo is simply not a viable option. 570 . 41 Freeman, "The Private Role in Public Governance" (footnote 8 above), p. 608. 
The cost of reform
A second critique of contractual regulation is to cite the cost of contractual reform. One of the central rationales for privatizing governmental functions is the savings that privatization promises, although the extent to which privatization actually does result in such savings is not fully understood. Certainly there is some empirical work, particularly on domestic services such as prison management, that supports claims of cost-cutting. 44 Such savings may accrue because contractors are free from expensive civil service requirements. Indeed, proponents of military privatization have emphasized that freedom from such requirements enables greater "nimbleness". 45 And while contractors may earn more for a particular job, their pay is typically for a shorter term. They can be mobilized quickly on the front end and terminated quickly on the back end. Some proponents of privatization thus might argue that enhanced contractual requirements, such as human rights training provisions, self-evaluation, and accreditation would be costly ventures that would essentially re-bureaucratize the privatized work force, undermining the flexibility of private contractors and potentially reducing or even eliminating the very cost savings that provide the principal justification for privatization in the first place. 46 It is far from clear, however, that the costs of reforms would outweigh the savings they might generate, as there is a high price for not implementing some of the proposals suggested above. The argument that increased contractual requirements necessarily increase costs requires more empirical study, but at this point we do have evidence that the failure to incorporate certain requirements imposes hefty costs. Perhaps most notably, poor monitoring and oversight lead to corruption and waste that is itself quite expensive. Contractual terms that mandate comprehensive outside monitoring and require contractors to engage in self-evaluation, combined with increased resources for monitors, can therefore result in savings down the line.
The Iraq case provides some clear examples of the costs that arise from the failure to engage in serious contractual monitoring. As former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) official Alan Grayson has observed, "contracts were made that were mistakes, and were poorly, if at all, supervised [and] money was spent that could have been saved, if we simply had the right numbers of people." 47 Grayson has asserted that lack of employee screening and training, combined with poor government contract monitor oversight, led to 44 See, e.g., Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112 (1997), p. 1143 (claiming that their model "explains why in some -arguably mostcases, private provision leads to both lower costs and higher quality"); see also The various other corruption examples described previously have cost US taxpayers further millions of dollars.
Moreover, government reports suggest that the abuses that have come to light are not isolated instances but rather stem from systematic problems in oversight and monitoring. A recent DOD Inspector General study concluded that more than half of the Iraq contracts had not been adequately monitored.
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This fact is not surprising given that DOD reduced its acquisition workforce by more than half between 1990 and 2001, while the department's contracting workload increased by more than twelve percent.
51
In addition, those who were assigned to monitor contract performance were often inadequately trained. 52 Indeed, in an ironic twist, private contractors themselves are often hired to write the procedural rules governing contracting rules and monitoring protocols: the DOD handbook on the contracting process, for example, was drafted by one of its principal military contractors. 53 Similarly, with respect to the CPA, a report notes that the CPA had not kept accounts for the hundreds of millions of dollars of cash in its vault, had awarded contracts worth billions of dollars to American firms without tender, and had no idea what was happening to the money from the Development Fund for Iraq, which was being spent by the interim Iraqi government ministries. 54 Thus, a strong case can be made that better monitoring and other contractual reforms would actually save far more money than they would cost.
Perhaps even more significantly, failure to implement contractual reforms can lead to human rights abuses that result in enormous costs, both economic and non-economic, that are difficult to measure but that impose serious liabilities on the government. The role of CACI and Titan in the torture and cruel treatment of prisoners Abu Ghraib is just one example. The government has now tried seven uniformed officers for abuses at Abu Ghraib in proceedings that taxpayers must fund. If the Abu Ghraib victims succeed in their ATCA suits against CACI and Titan, either in court or in an out-of-court settlement, the litigations' costs presumably would ultimately be passed on to the government in higher contract fees. Indeed, even the fear of such litigation may result in expenses that companies such as CACI and Titan may factor into their bids. Beyond these economic costs, human rights abuse scandals cost the government untold amounts in reputation. These reputational losses impede the ability of diplomats to pursue not only human rights policies such as eradicating torture around the world in countries such as China, but also in building coalitions with other countries to engage in cooperative efforts -from trade to fighting terrorism. 55 Rebecca Weiner has recently sought to identify, and to some degree quantify, many of the costs of military outsourcing. 56 She emphasizes that the general indefinite quantity or indefinite cost framework of many of the contracts, in which contractors can simply charge the government a certain percentage above the price to them of the services they perform, has been quite expensive for the government (and for taxpayers). She also notes that insurance and workers' compensation are hidden costs not usually factored into the pricetag for outsourcing. Contract reform might reduce some of these costs.
Finally, the privatization of domestic functions, such as prisons and healthcare, provides some evidence that contractual reforms do not eat up all of the cost savings of privatization. Indeed, state governments in the United States have long implemented many of the contractual reforms discussed above, suggesting that even with such reforms contracting remains cost-effective. For example, state governments' contracts with companies that manage private prisons routinely require compliance with constitutional norms of human dignity, as well as training regarding these norms equivalent to the training state prison guards would receive. Similarly state governments' contracts with HMOs routinely require accreditation, self-evaluation, and private grievance mechanisms for patients who believe they were not treated fairly. Thus, while much more research quantifying the costs of privatization is necessary, it is difficult to argue that contractual reform would necessarily eliminate all of the cost savings that may accrue. 
Government and contractor resistance
A third critique of contractual reforms is that neither governments nor contractors would adopt them. Indeed, with respect to governmental actors, critics might claim that governments engage in privatization generally, and military privatization in particular, precisely to avoid the legal commitments that bind bureaucratic actors. According to this view, the US government used contractor interrogators and translators at Abu Ghraib prison in order to escape potential accountability for abuses. With respect to the contractors, critics might maintain that private military companies would not agree to more onerous contractual terms because the companies would view these measures as too expensive and cumbersome.
For both sets of actors, however, substantial evidence actually points in the opposite direction. More research is needed to understand the motivations of governments' privatization decisions as well as the interests of contractors. But there is certainly a case to be made that government actors and contractors would not be nearly as reluctant to embrace these reforms as critics have supposed.
Government actors
To begin with, the argument that governments privatize to avoid accountability runs into some difficulties because government actors do not necessarily escape responsibility merely by outsourcing particular tasks. As Chia Lehnardt argues in chapter eight of this volume, while some existing ambiguities might enable contractors to slip through certain cracks in international law, contractors do not exist in a regulatory void.
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In particular, the UN's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts aims to make clear that the "conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law," and that a person's conduct shall be attributed to the state if he or she is acting on the state's instructions or under the state's direction. 58 Courts and tribunals have at times applied principles of state responsibility for instrumentalities to impute the liability of companies onto states. At the same time, a decision not to privatize does not necessarily result in full accountability. Indeed, courts have not generally held large numbers of official governmental actors accountable for abuses under our existing legal regime. For example, in the wake of reports on widespread prisoner abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, very few governmental officials implicated in the abuse have faced trial. Thus far, only eleven uniformed soldiers have been convicted for cruel treatment at Abu Ghraib, and all of those tried have been relatively low-level actors. 60 Moreover, the first officer was not charged until April 2006. 61 To the extent that governmental actors want to avoid accountability for abuses, privatization is not particularly necessary. Moreover, because governments are not monolithic, even if some in any given administration seek to privatize in order to avoid accountability or funnel money to cronies, there are many who sincerely want to do their job and could spearhead efforts to reform the contract monitoring process.
Significantly, in the somewhat analogous arena of development and humanitarian aid, governmental and inter-governmental officials have voluntarily undertaken significant contractual regulation. For example, USAID has imposed extensive self-evaluation requirements and performance benchmarks on aid organizations. 62 Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has begun to experiment with beneficiary participation in program design and critiques of operations in refugee camps. 63 And the World Bank has established grievance mechanisms for people adversely affected by development projects, including public-private partnerships. 64 While one might think that military privatization would be more resistant to such increased contractual regulation, even here some reforms have occurred. For example, some of the existing Iraq contracts now include terms requiring stakeholder notification and participation. And the Department of Defense has begun to require more specificity in the terms of its military contracts. Its August 2005 contracting regulations require that agreements include terms stating that contractors are bound by international law and specifying that contractors must train their employees in applicable rules regarding the use of force. 65 Perhaps most importantly, even if government actors are not particularly eager to initiate reforms, NGOs or international organizations can push for them, or indeed launch them independently. Such organizations can pressure governments to include various safeguards in their contracts by promulgating international guidelines and then exposing (or mobilizing diplomatic pressure against) governments that refuse to adopt the guidelines. Along these lines, Amnesty International made reform of military contracts a centrepiece of its annual human rights report and a leading advocacy project for 2006. 66 In addition, NGOs can independently rate or "accredit" private military companies according to human rights compliance and other values. As noted previously, the NCQA began such an independent accreditation effort to assess HMOs in the United States. While these independent efforts are of course more difficult without full access to information, nonetheless, measurements can be used to give scorecards to different companies. These measures are then very easy for the government to later use as a contractual requirement (as has happened with NCQA). Moreover, NGOs can try to harness popular political pressure to get governments and companies to adopt its accreditation or evaluation metrics.
Private military companies
Although at first blush it might seem surprising, many private military contractors are both willing to accept, and in some cases are even leading the way toward, contractual reforms. Indeed, although contractors often grumble about enhanced regulation generally -arguing that such regulation increases costs and impedes flexibility -the reality is that they rarely refuse contracts on this basis, which is perhaps not so surprising given how lucrative these contracts are. 67 Moreover, as mentioned previously, private military companies are initiating extensive self-regulation efforts in both the United States and Britain. Interestingly, many private military companies are eager for more regulation and accreditation requirements because they want to distinguish themselves from what they view as "rogue" outfits that give the industry as a whole a bad name. Moreover, contractual (as opposed to legislative) reform may be appealing to such companies because it is more flexible and project-specific. Thus, there is no reason to think that contractual reform is unrealistic.
Market barriers to contractual regulation
Critics might also cite the varied nature of private military contractors as an impediment to contractual regulation. Private military companies are a diverse group that includes, depending on the definition of the term, military logistics firms, military strategy firms, and direct military provider firms. In addition, some companies, such as MPRI, are large, longestablished, and highly professionalized, with generals from major western militaries on their boards, while others are newcomers without the level of expertise, experience, or in some cases the commitment to professionalism. A one-size-fits-all approach therefore is inappropriate, one might argue, because of the range of functions that the firms provide. Furthermore, the differences may mean that some firms, such as the more established companies, may be more amenable to contract-based reform than others. For example, some firms may be better able to comply with contractual terms such as training requirements or private grievance systems (which require greater administrative infrastructure) than others. To the extent that contract enables tailoring of reforms to suit the particulars of a given company, results are likely to be piecemeal and therefore ineffectual. At the same time, critics might charge that regulating private military companies through contractual terms is the tail wagging the dog, as corruption and cronyism are rampant in the initial award of government contracts. Without addressing this corruption up front, one might think, reform of contractual terms can have little effect.
Nevertheless, despite the problems posed by the market's diversity and the potential for cronyism, the structure of the market for private military companies may in fact make contract the most effective regulatory approach. In a diverse market, contract has the advantage of flexibility. And there is no reason that contractual reforms cannot go hand in hand with other efforts to reduce corruption in the actual award of contracts.
Market diversity
One of the virtues of contract, as opposed to other forms of regulation, is that it is not a one-size-fits-all approach. As compared to treaty-based, statutory, or even regulatory reform, contractual reform can be implemented on a case-by-case basis and can be tailored to fit the particular type of firm. Contractual training requirements, could, for example, be moulded to suit the activities of the particular private military company in question. Thus, a government contract with a company such as Kellogg, Brown & Root that provides meals to troops might require employees to learn the limits of excessive force under international law, but would focus primarily on defensive use of force. A contract such as the CACI agreement providing military interrogators could require much more extensive training, homing in on the limits of proactive interrogation techniques. A contract with a company providing combat services, such as the Sierra Leonean government's agreement with the now disbanded Executive Outcomes, would require extensive training on offensive use of force on the battlefield. Similarly, contractual terms requiring companies to establish internal grievance mechanisms for those adversely affected by contractor actions could also vary according to the type of firm.
Moreover, the fact that contractual reform is inevitably piecemeal does not mean that such reform will necessarily be ineffectual. Indeed, although an estimated 90 different groups have entered the market for private military contracts, 68 only a very small number of firms, particularly in the United States, retain a significant market share. 69 These larger firms are likely to be the easiest to regulate. Even simply incorporating contractual reform in the most significant contracts with the largest firms would have important effects.
Cronyism and corruption
Many reforms to the terms of contracts at the back end may help address cronyism and corruption in the bidding process at the front end. There is no reason to think that seeking reform of contractual provisions and monitoring impedes or excludes efforts to reform the process by which contracts are awarded in the first place. Improvements in contractual monitoring, for example, will increase transparency and help prevent abuses. Similarly, accreditation by independent, third-party organizations will help serve as a brake on awards to contractors with histories of corruption. Accreditation provides information to the public at large, which can enhance the political incentives to award contracts to entities that receive high marks. And performance benchmarks also have an information-forcing effect that can help deter cronyism. To the extent that contractual terms are more specific and result-oriented, there is less room for contractors to take advantage of cronyism.
Furthermore, reforming contractual terms certainly can, and should, proceed in tandem with efforts to reform the contract award process. Specifically, as commentators have urged, 70 the government should dramatically reduce the number of no-bid contracts it enters into and should reduce the number of Freedom of Information Act exemptions it issues, thereby allowing for greater transparency in the bidding process. In addition, thirdparty agencies should not be permitted to conduct the bidding process and secure contracts that other agencies will administer, because such bifurcation tends to reduce oversight and accountability. But in any event, such reforms, while necessary, do not eliminate the need to reform the contracts themselves.
The feasibility of creating third-party beneficiary rights
A fifth critique might focus specifically on those contractual reforms that seek to give third parties rights either to be consulted in the contract design process or to bring grievances. 68 See Singer, Corporate Warriors (footnote 3 above), p. 78. 69 See Weiner, "Incorporating the Combat Zone" (footnote 56 above), p. 24. 70 See, e.g., Schooner, "Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib" (footnote 7 above). It is worth noting that, in a related setting, public outcry over the no-bid process resulted in quick reforms in the provision of disaster relief after Hurricane Katrina.
Critics could argue that such third-party participation would be unwieldy at best. For example, it would be very difficult to identify the appropriate third-party "beneficiaries" of a private military contract. Is a beneficiary anyone who is remotely affected by contractor actions? In the case of Iraq, for example, would any Iraqi citizen qualify as a beneficiary of a contract to train the Iraqi police? Are US citizens the beneficiaries of such contracts? The net could be drawn very widely indeed.
The flexibility of the contractual form again provides a means of addressing this problem. Beneficiaries could be defined differently depending on the context. Both at the front end in the design of agreements, and at the back end if they go awry, contracts can enable certain groups of beneficiaries to have a voice without opening up the process to broad and virtually unlimited involvement.
With respect to shaping contractual terms, the government and contractors can identify relevant stakeholders and include them based on the degree to which they stand to benefit from, or be harmed by, the contractor's actions. For example, in the case of a contract to train Iraqi police, affected stakeholders or beneficiaries might include interim governmental officials responsible for security, existing Iraqi trade associations or groups likely to provide employees in the police force, as well as political leaders and civil society leaders in the communities subject to policing. The contract could require the company providing training to consult with each of these groups in designing its training plan, to notify them of the planned course of action, and to seek input from them about key issues, problems, or difficulties. Such a consultation process would have the added benefit of alerting contractor employees to any cultural issues or sensitivities that could impede training efforts.
In other contexts, the relevant beneficiaries or stakeholders would be different. For example, in the case of an agreement between the US government and a private company to feed troops stationed in Iraq, the beneficiaries are the US troops and, by extension, the US public at large. Iraqis might of course be affected by the actions of such a company, for example if armed company employees responded defensively to a perceived attack. Nevertheless, because Iraqis are not the direct beneficiaries of the contract, they need not be included at the design stage. And though security concerns may make broad public notification in the United States problematic, some transparency is certainly possible.
With respect to grievance procedures, again different provisions could be made depending on the type of contract because some contracts are far more likely to lead to abuses that would require such grievance procedures than others. For example, military interrogation work, such as was performed at Abu Ghraib by CACI, obviously poses a fairly high risk of harm to the bodily integrity of Iraqi prisoners. These prisoners are, by definition, in detention and not free to leave. Even with well-trained interrogators, the risk of crossing the line between permissible and impermissible uses of pressure is ever-present. In such circumstances, grievance procedures are particularly appropriate.
By contrast, contractors supplying food to troops on the battlefield do not engage in work that is as likely to directly affect the bodily integrity of Iraqis or others. It is true, as noted above, that contractor employees may be armed to defend themselves, and inappropriate uses of force may occur. Nonetheless, the contractors' use of weapons is almost certain to be for defensive purposes only, and such uses of force are not at the core of the contractors' purpose. Thus, the risk of harm to bodily integrity is probably much lower, and provisions for grievance procedures would be less appropriate in such contracts.
Significantly, in analogous contexts governments and inter-governmental organizations have allowed for this type of beneficiary involvement, and line-drawing among different categories of beneficiaries has not proved unworkable. For example, some of the de-mining contracts between the US government and private companies in Iraq require stakeholder notification and participation. The agreement between the Army Corps of Engineers and Tetra Tech to provide munitions support and removal also includes a provision requiring "public involvement." 71 In this agreement, the contractor undertakes to "assist in responsiveness summaries, public meetings, restoration advisory boards, community restoration planning, administrative record establishment and maintenance, and other stakeholder forums that facilitate public involvement."
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The contract between the Corps and Zapata Engineering to remove hazards in Iraq (and Afghanistan) to ensure that lands and waters can be used safely contains a virtually identical provision. 73 And an agreement between the former Coalition Provisional Authority and Washington Group International to improve power systems within Iraq provides for "public participation in public outreach activities."
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Such provisions could become standard terms.
The World Bank has also required private companies to engage in such beneficiary consultation processes as a condition of receiving loan agreements for public-private development projects. For example, the Bank prompted Exxon, the lead company building an oil pipeline in Chad, to engage in extensive consultations with local groups during the research phase of the project, from 1993 until 1996. During this period, Exxon's subsidiary in Chad, known as Esso Tchad, sent sociologists, ethnologists, and various experts and consultants to the region.
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There are also models for third-party grievance procedures. 
Potential enforcement problems
Finally, critics of regulation by contract might point out that government contracts are particularly difficult to enforce, because generally only government actors (and the contractors) may enforce them. And government officials rarely do so. Indeed, as noted previously, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, the government did not terminate the contract with CACI, the company that had hired interrogators implicated in the abuse. Moreover, litigation in courts is also rare, and the enforcement actions the government does bring usually focus on issues such as corruption rather than other public law values such as human rights. And litigation in the US runs up against the so-called "government contractor immunity" defence, which may protect from litigation those companies acting under the direction of the US government.
While these enforcement difficulties undoubtedly exist, many of the contractual reforms proposed actually would help address them. Graduated penalties or government takeover of failing contracts might give the government more enforcement options when termination is politically difficult. Because such penalties are less extreme than outright termination, they are far more likely actually to be invoked by contract monitors, making them a more effective enforcement mechanism than the harsher (though rarely invoked) termination provisions. As noted previously, in the domestic context, states are using graduated penalties in their oversight of private nursing homes receiving public funding. 76 basis for a tort claim against the company and its employees. 78 The court found these standards relevant in evaluating whether the company and its employees breached applicable duties.
Furthermore, enforcement by individuals other than the government or the contractor is at least possible. As discussed above, third-party beneficiary suit provisions can be added to agreements to improve enforcement capabilities. At the same time, even without such reforms, ATCA provides a means for non-citizens to bring suit against contractors for human rights violations.
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The suits against CACI and Titan, for example, are proceeding under ATCA. Plaintiffs will have to demonstrate that the substantive international law violations alleged, including torture, were claims similar in nature to those existing in 1789 when the statute was enacted. 80 And they will have to demonstrate "state action" in order to make a successful claim for torture. 81 Nevertheless, such claims are viable. involved a products liability claim (not a claim regarding a services contract) and in any event limited the defence to circumstances in which the government set the design specifications with reasonable precision, leaving little discretion to the contractor. As noted previously, most of the Iraq contracts were not at all specific and left broad discretion to the contractor, thus removing the predicate for contractor immunity. Moreover, at least one court has concluded that the defence does not apply to international human rights claims in any event. 87 Enforcement is not impossible, particularly if reforms are implemented. And whatever deficiencies there may be, such reforms will at least be an improvement on the current system. Accordingly, we should try to implement such reforms instead of declaring them a failure in advance.
Conclusion
Based on the present state of military privatization, it is clear that some reform of the contracting process is sorely needed. None of the arguments in favour of doing nothing is convincing. Whatever the imperfections of contractual reform, we must at least make the effort. At the other extreme, some international law scholars, policymakers, and NGOs either resist privatization altogether or insist that the only useful reforms involve increasing the mechanisms for holding private actors directly responsible under international law. Such critics might equate a focus on contractual reform with capitulation.
Those concerned about abuses committed by private military companies cannot simply rail against privatization altogether, however, because the trend towards privatization will be difficult to reverse in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, energy is better spent seeking reform. There is, in any case, no reason that formal international legal instruments need to be the only possible regulatory mechanisms. After all, it is a regrettable, but nevertheless true, fact of international law that even state actors are only rarely prosecuted for human rights abuses. Even if all international instruments were interpreted to apply to private military contractors, we would still need to seek additional alternative accountability mechanisms in order to achieve meaningful oversight. Accordingly, the claim advanced here is that reforming the terms of the contracts themselves should be one avenue of reform among many. In addition, unlike amending or reinterpreting formal international legal instruments, NGOs could create accreditation regimes without any official governmental support. NGOs could identify those companies 86 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). most committed to curtailing abuses and then mobilize political pressure to make sure only those companies are awarded contracts. And while such activities could be undertaken regardless of governmental approval, we might also find that governmental support (and even support from the private military companies themselves) is not as difficult to achieve as might first be supposed.
